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Introduction
Nietzsche is often viewed-and correctly I think-as a social critic,
exposing the ressentiment and "life-negating" rejection of this world that
lies at the heart of our Socratic and Christian heritage. The noble, healthy
instinct to life shifts in favor of a plebeian; decadent denial ofthe instincts
a' morality that despises the body as the seat of all misery and error.
Dialectics, the Socratic equation of reason-vIrtue-happiness, is a last resort
in the battle against the instincts, against the noble: a case of plebeian
ressentiment. This mistrust of the passions, a spurning of this life, of this
world, begat a turn toward the ideal: a tum toward nothingness, a turn toward
Being. Philosophers desired knowledge of the unchanging in that which
changes, the necessary in what appears contingent, the eternal. The defini
tion of Being is thus the definition of nothingness; in order for something to
Be, to have Being, it must literally be no-thing. It is no great surprise then,
that the philosophers never found Being, that Being never manifested itself.
"'There must be mere appearance, there must be some deception which
prevents us from perceiving that which has being: where is the deceiver? We
have found him,' they cry ecstatically; 'it is the senses! These senses, which
are so immoral in other ways too, deceive us concerning the true world'" (TI,
p. 480). Essentially, that which had no-being, was no-thing, was elevated to
that of the highest Being (ultimately, God), and provided the grounds for
repudiating the senses, the most real thing about us, the basis of any healthy
morality. 1
On Megill and The Birth of Tragedy
Just as Nietzsche inscribes the metaphysical tradition within his
own "life-affirming" perspective, dismantling the Platonic tradition's quest
for Truth and its promise of a privileged perspective, contemporary thinkers
have attempted to disempower Nietzsche's critique by subsuming it within
their own metaphysical framework. Allan Megill's treatment of Nietzsche
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inhis book Prophets 0/Extremity, is such an instance. Megill sees Nietzsche
as an "aestheticist," and under that rubric appropriates Nietzsche within a
metaphysical perspective that pours the foundation for his interpretation of,
and objection to, Nietzsche's project. This move fails, however, not because
Nietzsche's cannot be out-flanked, or redescribed, but because Megill's
attempt to turn the tables on Nietzsche lacks persuasive textual support.
Megill often gets Nietzsche importantly right-there is a sense in which
"aestheticist" is an appropriate label for thinkers like Nietzsche-but once
Megill defines the aestheticist's position, he situates it within a world of
appearance and reality, a world that gives Nietzsche's thought implications
that lead Megill to reject that position. The dispute, then, hinges on how
Megill situates the aestheticist space: Megill starts offon the wrong foot by
wedging the aestheticist "realm" between the "really real" and "mere
appearance"; caught between these two realms, Nietzsche cannot ignore,
but cannot access, "reality." This notion of Nietzsche's commitment to an
inaccessible reality, however, is the result of Megill's interpretation of
Nietzsche's Apollo-Dionysus duality in The Birth o/Tragedy. I will argue
that Megill's interpretation of Apollo and Dionysus is an unfounded over
simplification that fails to account for what is most significant about The
Birth o/Tragedy, namely, its explanation of the development of lragedy
through the union of Apollo and Dionysus.
Prior to Megill's interpretation of The Birth 0/ Tragedy, his concep
tion ofthe aestheticist already bears the seeds of his metaphysical determi
nation of Nietzsche's text:
As it is usually employed, the word aestheticism denotes an
enclosure within a self-contained realm of aesthetic objects and
sensations, and hence also denotes a separation from the "real
world" of nonaesthetic objects. Here, however, I am using the
word in a sense that is almost diametrically opposed to its usual
sense. I am using it to refer not to the condition of being enclosed
within the limited territory of the aesthetic, but rather to an
atlempt to expand the aesthetic to embrace the whole of reality.
To put it another way. I am using it to refer to a tendency to see
"art" or "language" or "discourse" or "text" as constituting the
primary realm of human experience (Megill, p. 2).

In spite of the fact that Megill is using "aestheticism" to denote the
broadening ofthe aesthetic to the exclusion of the nonaesthetic, rejecting the
traditional sense of the term which entailed an enclosure separated from
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reality. he nonetheless employs the aesthetic-nonaesthetic distinction to
make his point; Megill places his definition of aestheticism within a
perspective where the aesthetic-nonaesthetic distinction is very important.
Implicit in his conception of the aestheticist poSition is a distinction between
"the primary realm ofhuman experience" and "the real world." In expanding
the realm of aesthetic objects to encompass all experience, Megill neverthe
less retains the notion ofnonaesthetic objects beyond our experience. These
inaccessible nonaesthetic objects remain the measuring stick of truth, and
lead Megill to see us as "cutofffrom 'things' andconfined to a confrontation
with 'words' alone" (Megill, p. 2).
Megill situates himself outside ofthe aestheticist position, a move
which places "truth" beyond the reach of the aestheticist. Megill, and
"truth," are outside, casting a critical eyeinward on the foolhardy aestheticist
who seems unconcerned with the way things really are. TIlls perspective is
key to the distinction between his project in Prophets ofExtremity and the
interpretations others have advanced:
Foucault, Derrida, and their followers have already done much to
suggest the importance of this [aestheticist] aspect ofNielzsche •s
project. But they do so from inside the aestheticist perspective,
and hence from a standpoint that is certainly not concerned WiUl
"correctness" in interpretation. I propose here to cast a scholarly
eye on the Nietzscbean beginnings of aestheticism (Mcgill,
p.34).

Foucault, Derrida, and others have occupied the aestheticist perspective
precisely because they deny any place to stand outside of that perspective.
Megill's position, from which he criticizes the aestheticist, is constructed
from a belief in a "true" world, a world beyond all redescription, a belief
aestheticists whole-heartedly deny. Megill's preoccupation with the "true"
world is supposedly what distinguishes his "scholarly" view from the view
of alleged "acstheticists" like Foucault and Derrida.
Megill's interpretation of the Apollo-Dionysus dualit:y in The Birth
of Tragedy ultimately relegates Nietzsche to Megill's line-up of
"aestheticists." According to Megill, Dionysus is the symbol of immediate
vision, genuine knowledge, the "really Real." Apollo, however, is the
primary realm of human experience, the veil which protects us from the
harsh reality of the Dionysian. The Apollonian constructions that mediate
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our understanding never allow us a direct and unrnediated glimpse ofreality,
but are nonetheless necessary for our survival. As Megill explains,
Nietzsche sees immediacy as unattainable, but still desired it; he
views concepts as undesirable, but also as necessary. Tbis puts
him in an odd position, opposing the reduction of concepts to
immediate vision and intuition, but at the same time refusing to
forget vision and intuition wben dealing with the world of
concepts (Megill, p. 37).
So long as we share Megill's conception ofthe Dionysian as an inaccessible
reality, Nietzsche remains in a difficult position indeed: with truth out of
reach, with no hope of obtaining genuine knowledge, he is confined to a
frivolous, inconsequential realm of play, frolicking in Apollonian illusion.
Essential to Megill's construction ofthis dilemma is his association
ofApollo and Dionysus-which he takes as tokens for a "mediate-immedi
ate" distinction-with a parallel distinction between skepticism and cer
tainty. To say that one is in a particular relation to the "immediate,"
according to Megill, is to make an epistemological claim: statements are
more or less true to the extent that they tap directly into un-mediated
"reality." The aestheticist's predicament, then, is cashed out in terms of a
simultaneous commitment to, and refusal of, Dionysian immediacy-as
certainty. This epistemological twist on the mediate-immediate distinction,
however, is not supported by The Birth of Tragedy. Although there are
several instances where Nietzsche describes Apollo and Dionysus in terms
of "mediation" and "immediacy," his use of those terms does not signify a
concurrent distinction between the uncertainty of mediation and the cer
tainty of the immediate. For example:
Among the peculiar art effects of musical tragedy we had to
emphasize an Apollonian illusion by means of which we were
supposed to be saved from the immediate unity with Dionysian
music, while our musical excitement could discharge itself in an
Apollonian field and in relation to a visible intennediary world
that had been interposed (BT, p. 139).
While it is evident that some kind of mediate-immediate distinction is at
work in this passage, Megill's conclusion that this situation has somehow
cut us off from "reality" is unfounded. In fact, Megill's version of the
mediate-immediate distinction is not born out by Nietzsche's use ofApollo
and Dionysus in the remainder of this passage. As Nietzsche continues fTom
above:
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At the time we thougbt that we had observed bow precisely
through this discharge the intennediary world of the action on the
stage, and the drama in general bad been made visible and
intelligible from the inside to a degree that in all the other
Apollonian art remains unattained. Wbere the Apollonian re
ceives wings from the spirit ofmusic and soars, weUmsfound the
highest intensification ofits powers, and in this fraternal union of
Apollo and Dionysus we had to recognize the apex of the
Apollonian as well as the Dionysian aims of art (BT, p. 139).

Megill's interpretation of Nietzsche' s mediate-immediate distinction as an
appearance-reality distinction makes itdifficultto understand how Nietzsche
could use that distinction-some kind of interaction between appearance
and reality-to explain the mutual intensification of ApollOnian and
Dionysian powers peculiar to Attic tragedy. The inability to account for
Nietzsche's use ofthe duo to explain the development of tragedy is a serious
failing ofMegiU' s interpretation, for it is the development of art, and tragedy
in particular, through the union of Apollo and Dionysus that is the principal
theme ofThe Birth ofTragedy.2Here, we would do well to abandon Megill's
interpretation, and try to understand how, together, Apollo and Dionysus
represent not only the dynamics of the dramatic dithyramb, but the tragic
world-view that gave it birth.
According to Nietzsche, the ancient Greeks' acute sensitivity to
what they "knew and felt [to be] the terror and horror of existence" (BT,
p.42) was the origin of Attic tragedy, and could be explained most
profoundly by using the symbolism of Apollo and Dionysus. The relation
ship, however, between the horrors of existence and the Apollo-Dionysus
duality is not, as Megill would have us believe, as Simple as to say that
Dionysus represents this horrible reality while Apollo succeeds in covering
it up. For the ancient Greeks, existence was horrible because it was, at
bottom, an unbearable contradiction-a contradiction fully represented
only by Apollo and Dionysus in union. In part, as intoxication, Dionysus
represents the unity of all existence prior to inclividuation-tbe breakdown
ofinhibltions, the loss of all existence prior to individuation (ST, p. 36). At
the same time, however, this Dionysian unity is necessarily clivlded into
individuals. Apollo represents the delimitation of Dionysus: "this apolheo
2 "We now approach the real gonl of our investigation, which is dirccted toward
knowledge of the Dionysian-Apollonian genius and its art product., or allensl toward some
feeling for and understanding of this mystery of union" (BT, p. 48),
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sis of individuation knows but one law-the individual. i.e.• the delimiting
of the boundaries of the individual, measure in the Hellenic sense" (BT.
p. 46). Apollo and Dionysus. then, are inextricably bound together as they
symbolize the primordial contradiction of existence:
the fundamental knowledge of the oneness of everything exis
tent, the conception of individuation as the primal cause of evil,

and of art as the joyous hope that the spell of individuation may
be broken in augury of a restored oneness (BT, p. 74).

Dionysus is whole yet necessarily manifest through Apollonian individua
tion; and Apollo's "illusion," the way he demarcates the individual. is
al ways merely another form of the same Dionysian unity. Arising from this
contradiction, tragedy provided the illusion that inspired the hope that the
pain of individuation would somehow be resolved.
The tragic art inspired by the horror of existence in fact has its origin
in that contradiction, and retains Apollo and Dionysus as the representatives
ofits fundamental elements: the tragiC myth and the satyr chorus. 3 Tragedy' s
peculiar art-effect is the result ofbeholding the Apollonian myth that grows
out of the primordial unity represented by the satyr chorus. The chorus shuts
out the everyday world of individuation, and lulls the tragic spectator into
an identification with primordial unity-the wholeness prior to individua
tion. But this is dangerous, since a return to everyday existence after a
glimpse into the unity of everything would result in a listless, will-negating
apathy towards life: nausea at individuation.4 But it is at this point that the
tragic myth intervenes to halt our slide into oblivion. The Apollonian drama.
the tragiC myth, is intermediary only in the sense thatitintervenes to prevent
the audience of Attic tragedy from completely identifying with the primal
unity that the music of the satyr chorus symbolized. When the Apollonian
myth is viewed by the tragic spectator, in his susceptibility to the music of
3 "Let us recall our surprise at the chorus and the tragic hero of that tragedy, neither of
which we could reconcile wilhout customs any more than with tradition-till we rediscov
ered this duality itself as the origin and essence of Greek tragedy, as the expression of two
interwoven artistic impUlses, the Apollonian and the Dionysian ... " (BT, p. 81).
4 "For the rapture ofthe Dionysian stare with its annihilation of the ordinary bounds and
limits of existence contains, while it lasts, a lethargic element in which all personal
experiences of the past become immersed. This chasm of oblivion separates the worlds of
everyday reality and of Dionysian reality. But as soon as this everyday reality re-enrers
consciousness, it is experienced as such, with nausea: an ascetic, will-negating mood is the
fruit of these states ... " (BT, pp. 59-60).
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the chorus and the unity it symbolIzed, it is seen in a clarity and intensity that
is absent in all other strictly Apollonian art-forms. In the tragic myth, the
destruction of the tragic hero both places our sympathy in the individUal,
making individuation something with which we can live,S and reminds the
tragic spectator of the unity that lies beneath individuation which the tragic
hero prepares to join through his destruction. 6 This latter effect, the tragic
myth's suggestions of a unity that lies beneath it, gives the tragic spectator
the urge to tear the myth aside and behold the primordial unity. This tragic
effect is what Nietzsche calls the experience of "having to see at the same
time that... [one] also longed to transcend all seeing ... " (BT, p. 140). This
peculiar tension has its roots in the character of existence as contradiction:
intensified by the satyr chorus, the tragic myth suggests a unity beneath
individuation such that the spectator wishes to get beyond the pain of
individuation and behold the blissful primordial unity; the unity, however,
is only manifest through individuals, and to do without the myth would be
to simultaneously do without the unity-one must endure indi viduation to
experience its fundamental unity.
To be sure, passages that discuss aspects of this phenomenon of
"having to see but longing to get beyond all seeing," passages that ally
Dionysus with a "primordial unity" hidden behind Apollo's veil, seem to
support Megill's interpretation of the Apollo-Dionysus opposition as an
opposition between appearance and reality:
Now, ["under the charm of the Dionysian,"7] with the gospel of
universal harmony, each one feels himself not only united,
reconciled, and fused with his neighbor, but as one with bim, as
if the veil of maya had been torn aside and were now merely
fluttering in tatters before the mysterious primordial unity (BT,
p.37).
Megill wants this passage to identify the Dionysian with an independent
unity underlying manifold Apollonian veils, a substratum revealed after
those veils have been torn aside. Central to my dispute Witll Megill is fue
5 "Thus the Apollonian tears us out of the Dionysian universality and lets us find delight
in individuals; it attaches our pity to them, and by means of them it satisfies our sense of
beauty which longs for great and sublime forms ... " (BT. p. 128).
'''On the other hand, by means of the same tragic myth, in the person of the tragic hero,
it knows how to redeem us from the greedy thirst for this existence, and with an admonishing
gesture it reminds us of another existence and a higher pleasure for which the struggling hero
prepares himself by means of his destruction ... " (BT, p. 125).
1 (BT, p. 37). Nietzsche's words, top of the same paragraph.
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disagreement over how to interpret Nietzsche's notion of the "primordial
unity." Megill takes it to be Nietzsche's way oftalldng about the really real,
the thing-in-itself. But first of all, as it has already been stressed, an
interpretation that delimits and relegates Apollo and Dionysus to two
separate spheres cannot account for the interaction that explains the tragic
world-view andits art-form. Byinterpreting the "primordial unity" indepen
dently of Apollonian individuation, Megill is guilty of an unwarranted
abstraction; Apollo and Dionysus are meaningless without each other. And
secondly, we can refer to persuasive textual support that indicates that the
"primordial unity" was, for Nietzsche, only one more illusion:
It is an eternal phenomenon: the insatiable will always fmds a
way to detain its creatures in life and compel them to live on by
means of an illusion spread over things. One is chained by the
Socratic love of knowledge and the delusion of being able
thereby to heal the eternal wound of existence; another is en
snared by art's seductive veil ofbeauty fluttering before his eyes;
still another by the metaphysical comfort that beneath the whirl
of phenomena eternal life flows on indestructibly-(BT, pp.
109-110; myempbasis).

So, not only does Megill's interpretation of Apollo and Dionysus as
appearance and reality fail to account for Nietzsche's union of that opposi
tion to explain Attic tragedy, but it also seems that Nietzsche explicitly
speaks against an interpretation ofthe primordial unity as a "thing-in-itself."
The underpinning to Megill's assignment of Apollo as mediator is
the notion that somewhere beneath this world of appearance lurks the
"thing-in-itself." Megill's commitment to the appearance-reality distinc
tion, a distinction that posits the "thing-in-itself' as the standard of truth
lying beneath mere appearance, casts Apollo as a mediator that obscures.
Megill's perspective sees Apollo as necessary, since we cannot bear
Dionysian reality, but unfortunate because we would really like to get at the
"thing-in-itself." Nietzsche. however, in rejecting the notion of the "thing
in-itself," has no grounds to consider Apollo "necessary but unfortunate."
He makes this clear in On Truth and Lie in an Extramoral Sense, written in
the same period as "The Birth of Tragedy. It is Nietzsche's treatment of
concepts in OTL that Megill takes as evIdence ofNietzsche's dissatisfaction
with Apollonian illusIon and his subsequent entrapment in the aestheticist' s
dilemma. According to Megill, Nietzsche denies both our capacity to behold
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Dionysian immediacy and the adequacy of concepts for representing the
"thing-in-itself'-in neither realm, Apollonian or Dionysian. can we hope
to obtain genuine knowledge. What Nietzsche objects to in On Truth and
Lie, however, is not the inadequacy of concepts to represent the "thing in
itself," but the metaphysician who forgets that concepts are based on
arbitrary differentiations and that the "thing-in-itself' is only the abstraction
of these conventional designations from their consequences. 8 Nietzsche's
point is not that we are cut off from the "thing-in-itself," but that the "thing
in-itself" is a nonsensical and useless notion.
Megill finds Nietzsche's rejection ofthe "thing-in-itself," Nietzsche's
failure to distinguish between appearance and reality, a reckless and
untenable position. As Megill so clearly states:
one can call everything "illusion" ifone wishes, just as one can
call everything "disclosure" or "text." But this does not abolish
the distinction between, say, an interpretation of the experience
of being run over by a truck and the experience itself-a distinc
tion which every language, if it is to function on something more
than a purely fantastic level, mustsomehow accommexlate (Megill,
p.42).
In calling for a distinction between the "interpretation" ofan experience and
the expcrlcnce "itself," Megill once again draws the lines that oppose his
position to fue aestheticist's. Of course. aestheticists will deny that such a
distinction needs to be made. Nietzsche's point is simply that no experience
occurs independently of a perspective, and hence independently of an
•"That is to say, a uniformly valid and binding designation is invented for things, and
this legislation of language likewise establisbes the fll'St laws of truth" (OlL, p. 81). Truth,
according to Nietzsche, only exists as aconvention oflanguage. with purely practicaloriginsj
it is to one's advantage to use the "true" designations in appropriate ways because they
facilitate co-existence with others. "What arbitrary differentiations! What one-sided prefer
ences, first for this, then for that property of a thing! The various languages placed side by
side show that with words it is never a question of truth, never a question of adequate
expression; otherwise there would not be so many languages. The 'thing in itself' (which is
precisely what the pure truth, apart from any of its consequences. would be) is likewise
~omething quite incomprehensible to the creator of language and something not in the least
worth striving for" (OlL, p. 82). The "thing in itself," the pure truth apart from its
consequences (which is a convention of language apart from its consequences) is not worth
striving for because we only use "true" designations in order to take advantage of tbeir
consequences. In Megill's intelpretation, it seems he is taking Nietzsche's use of ''pure truth"
in this passage to refer to a true world really "out there," not worth striving for only because
we cannot attain it. In light of Nietzsche's genealogy of truth on preceding pages, however,
Megill's intelpretation is less than convincing.
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interpretation.9 One can talk about an experience "in itself' ifone wants to,
butit will at best only be an abstraction from some particular experience. The
aestheticist does not see a need to distinguish between trucks and interpre
tations oftrucks; there is, fundamentally ,just one kind oftruck: the kind you
don't want to get hit by. In each case of "being run over by a truck," there
is someone being run over. And that person is probably just as dead as the
personwho gets hitby the truck "itself." Megill, however, can 'thelp but take
the notion of "interpretation" lightly, as if an interpretation were merely a
mirage that fades as it approaches. From Megill's perspective, Nietzsche is
cut off from reality, dancing foolishly in a realm of play at his own peril,
ignoring the real world in a fanciful idealism. Some day, Megill seems to
hope, that truck will come around the corner-notsome wispy interpretation
of a truck, but the "Truck-itself' in all its weighty reality-and flatten a
deserving Nietzsche who was playing in the middle of the street.

9 Here I am employing the distinction between "perspective" and "interpretation"
pointed out in Alan Schrift's book, Nietzsche and the Question ofInterpretation. Nietzsche's
"~rspecti:alism" is his re~ognition that all experiences are inextricable from a particular
~lllt of vle.w, ,?r perspective. No one has an "objective" view, a privileged perspective.
'Inte,?retahon refers t~ What each of us does with our particul ar perspective, how we assign
mearung to those expenences.
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